Peace, But No Control: DRC–Rwanda Accord Fails to Unlock Mineral Trade — Yet
A U.S.-brokered peace agreement signed in Washington between the DRC and Rwanda on June 27 was billed as a reset for Central Africa’s most strategically important mineral corridor. The deal committed both sides to troop withdrawals, disarmament of armed groups, and the establishment of a regional economic framework for cross-border trade and infrastructure integration.
More than a month later, the political choreography has not translated into commercial access. The eastern Congo remains fractured, key routes remain militarised, and the mineral trade is still operating through informal—and often illicit—channels.
Cross-Border Trade: Open Borders, Closed Supply Chains
While formal diplomacy has eased tensions, the underlying structure of trade has not changed meaningfully. The M23 rebel group continues to control sections of North Kivu, including segments of the Goma–Rutshuru–Bunagana corridor—a critical artery for coltan and cobalt exports. No Rwandan troop withdrawal has been verified as of early August, and the DRC has yet to act against the FDLR militia, as stipulated.
Yet paradoxically, informal commerce has expanded. Since relative calm returned to Goma earlier this year, daily border crossings at the Petite Barrière and Grande Barrière posts have surged to over 50,000 people per day, nearing pre-pandemic highs. Small-scale trade in agricultural goods and consumer products has rebounded, particularly on the Rwandan side, which saw exports to the DRC rise 32% in 2024 to $229.5 million.
However, this consumer-facing trade boom is not matched in the formal mineral sector:
27+ mining sites in eastern DRC remain inaccessible to legal operators due to insecurity.
Illicit mineral exports are still valued at over $1 billion annually, undermining tax revenue and traceability.
Insurance premiums on mineral shipments remain 30–50% higher than pre-2023 levels.
For the DRC, this dual economy—booming informal trade, stagnant formal mining—presents a long-term fiscal and regulatory risk.
Implications for Investors
International finance institutions and private capital are watching closely. The World Bank, AfDB, and European lenders have indicated readiness to resume funding for key infrastructure, such as the $760 million Ruzizi III hydropower project and cross-border customs upgrades. But disbursements are contingent on tangible progress: verified troop withdrawals, rebel disarmament, and the implementation of mineral certification protocols.
The proposed economic framework, outlined on August 1, includes commitments to:
Develop joint customs and trade facilities;
Expand local mineral processing capacity;
Formalise mineral value chains across the DRC–Rwanda border;
Link trade corridors to the U.S.-backed Lobito Corridor.
These measures are directionally sound. But at present, no infrastructure has broken ground, no mineral processing deals have been signed, and no new logistics corridor has been secured. Until then, investors remain exposed to fragmentation, force majeure risk, and ESG liabilities tied to conflict-linked minerals.
Private companies in logistics, smelting, and mineral trading will need to maintain:
Redundant routing options (e.g. through Uganda or Tanzania);
Enhanced traceability and due diligence for 3TG and cobalt sourcing;
Political risk hedges, including insurance and off-take contract protections.
Some movement is occurring. U.S.-based KoBold Metals recently signed a lithium exploration deal in southern DRC, citing U.S. diplomatic progress. But this activity remains concentrated in regions outside the eastern conflict zone.
Bottom Line
The DRC–Rwanda peace accord has created a framework for long-term stability and trade integration. But critical supply chains remain physically and politically blocked. Until territorial control changes hands and enforcement mechanisms are in place, the region’s most valuable exports—cobalt, coltan, tin—will remain high-risk, and investment will remain conditional.