White Gold, Red Lines: The Bolivian Lithium Election

Bolivia’s vote to power Western EVs — at China’s expense

ON AUGUST 17th, Bolivians will vote in a presidential election that could have global business ramifications, especially for the electric vehicle (EV) industry. Beneath Bolivia’s salt flats lie the world’s largest identified lithium resources, about 38% of known reserves. Yet despite this abundance, the country remains a marginal producer. A toxic mix of extractive nationalism, fragile institutions, and geopolitical entanglements has left much of this “white gold” locked underground.

For years, Bolivia’s socialist MAS (Movement for Socialism) party has pursued a state-led industrial model. It prioritised lithium deals with Chinese and Russian firms, most notably, a $1 billion agreement with China’s CATL consortium and a $970 million contract with Russia’s Uranium One Group. These opaque partnerships offered technology and capital, but on terms tightly controlled by the Bolivian state, including 51% ownership for the government and downstream industrialisation requirements.

Western companies, including Germany’s ACI Systems and U.S-based EnergyX, were left out or pushed aside. ACI’s $1.3 billion joint venture collapsed under local pressure in 2019. EnergyX and other U.S. direct lithium extraction startups have run pilot projects but were ultimately passed over in favour of Chinese and Russian proposals. The result is that, while Bolivia has signed multi-billion-dollar deals, production has yet to begin—and political risk looms large.

Now, that risk may upend the entire lithium strategy.

The MAS coalition is fracturing. A bitter split between President Luis Arce and former leader Evo Morales has opened the door to a centre-right opposition that promises a dramatic pivot. These challengers want to tear up the current contracts, initiate open bidding, and court U.S and European investment. They argue Bolivia has traded away strategic autonomy for slow-moving, lopsided deals with authoritarian allies, and that Western firms offer better technology, transparency, and returns.

For Chinese and Russian stakeholders, the financial and strategic stakes are high. If the opposition wins and cancels the deals, roughly $2 billion in pledged foreign investment could evaporate. More broadly, Beijing would lose a foothold in one of Latin America’s most strategic resource plays. Bolivia forms part of the “lithium triangle” alongside Chile and Argentina, where China has aggressively secured supply to feed its dominant battery industry. CATL alone controls over a third of global EV battery production. Losing Bolivia would be a blow to that supply chain and a symbolic loss in the U.S-China contest for resource influence in the Global South.

Western automakers and clean-tech firms see Bolivia’s election as a potential inflection point. Companies like Albemarle, Eramet, and startups linked to Tesla have shown interest in tapping its vast reserves. A government that offers legal certainty and transparent bidding—without ties to authoritarian partners—could position Bolivia as a major source in Western EV supply chains. While it would not end the West’s broader reliance on China, it could diversify upstream access and support U.S. and European efforts to nearshore critical minerals.

But it won’t be simple. The political capital needed to renegotiate contracts, overcome local resistance in regions like Potosí, and develop infrastructure remains significant. Even if new contracts are signed, commercial production will take years. Investors would be betting not on quick returns, but on long-term positioning in a sector set to grow exponentially.

Still, the logic is compelling. With global lithium demand projected to quadruple by 2030, and the and EU both scrambling to secure critical minerals, Bolivia’s reserves are too large to ignore. The election will determine whether they remain politically gridlocked or are finally brought to market.

This vote is not just about Bolivia’s next president. It is a referendum on who gets to shape the future of lithium—and with it, the global energy transition.

 

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